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Abstract: Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless, 
there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine the 
first known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip II 
of Spain entered into hundreds of contracts whose value and due date depended on 
verifiable, exogenous events such as the arrival of silver fleets. We show that this allowed 
for effective risk-sharing between the king and his bankers. The existence of state-
contingent debt also sheds light on the nature of defaults – they were simply 
contingencies over which Crown and bankers had not contracted previously.  
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Mitchener, Richard Portes, Moritz Schularick, Richard Sylla, Jaume Ventura, Paul Wachtel, Mark Wright 
and seminar participants at the Harvard PIEP Workshop, CIFAR, Caltech, Colorado, Carlos III, 
ESSEC/THEMA, NYU-Stern, LSE, ESSIM, UCLA-Anderson, Vanderbilt, and Copenhagen Business 
School. Drelichman acknowledges financial support from SSHRCC, CIFAR, and the UBC Hampton Fund. 
Voth thanks the Spanish Education Ministry for a research grant. All errors are ours. 
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I. Introduction 
Non-contingent sovereign debt can be destabilizing because it creates a need for pro-
cyclical fiscal policies, aggravating cyclical downturns (Eichengreen 2002). Under 
extreme circumstances, negative shocks lead to defaults; GDP typically falls, trade 
plummets, and financial systems implode.1 Economists and policy-makers alike have 
argued that debt indexed to the capacity to pay can reduce the risk of bankruptcy and 
smooth consumption (Kletzer, Newbery, and Wright 1992; Borensztein and Mauro 2004; 
Borensztein et al. 2004). State-contingent debt is conceptually attractive, but few GDP-
indexed bonds have been issued (Griffith-Jones and Sharma 2006).2 Most instances – 
such as Argentina’s and Greece’s GDP-linked bonds – followed default episodes.3 
Overall, there is substantial skepticism that governments can successfully issue 
contingent debt. 
In this paper, we examine a case of large-scale issuance of state-contingent debt. 
Philip II of Spain (r. 1556-98) borrowed funds equivalent to approximately 60% of GDP 
– the first case in history of sovereign debt reaching proportions broadly similar to those 
in modern economies. A significant share of this debt carried contingency clauses. When 
invoked, interest rates were reduced or loan maturities extended. Bankers and Crown 
signed contingent loan contracts over decades, despite four payment stops. 
Why did a 16th century monarch and his financiers succeed where modern states 
and investment banks fail? We argue that two factors were key. First, the king’s need to 
spend ahead of revenue was particularly large. Expenditure – dominated by war financing 
                                                
1 Eaton and Fernandez (1995), Rose (2005). 
2 Some scholars have argued that all sovereign debt is de facto contingent (Grossman and Van Huyck 
1988). 
3 Greece avoided an outright default through a “voluntary” restructuring. 
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– fluctuated wildly from year to year; revenue was broadly stable.4 The need for 
“intertemporal barter” (Kletzer and Wright 2000) was acute. In this environment, the 
principal risk for the monarch was a shortfall of liquidity; risk-sharing was therefore 
valuable.5 Second, there were observable, verifiable state variables reflecting the strength 
of the monarch’s finances. For example, the size of silver fleets from the American 
colonies, as well as the yield from individual tax streams controlled by third parties, 
served as a ready reference for payments due. 
Using a hand-collected dataset containing 434 loan contracts between Philip II 
and his bankers, we analyze the market for contingent debt. Bad news were effectively 
translated into lower payment obligations or later due dates – risk-sharing between 
borrowers and lenders worked. The arrangement between lenders and king also survived 
Philip II’s famous defaults. The king suspended payments no less than four times during 
his long reign. Defaults involved larger shocks than the ones contracted on in individual 
contingent loans. They also entailed contingencies that were difficult to write into 
contracts – principally the outbreak and the outcome of wars. Our data show that the 
pricing of loans did not change adversely after the payment stops. We conclude that all 
debt was de facto state-contingent in circumstances not specified in loan contracts; 
defaults were excusable (Grossman and Van Huyck 1988). 
Our work relates to the debt sustainability literature.6 Amongst many, Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981) and Tomz (2007) have argued that reputational concerns – and 
indirectly, access to future consumption smoothing – are key in explaining why sovereign 
                                                
4 Silver revenues were highly volatile; we describe them below. 
5 Elsewhere, we have shown that Philip II’s famous defaults do not reflect insolvency, but were caused by 
liquidity crises (Drelichman and Voth 2010).  
6 We also contribute to the literature on the hedging of macro risks by new financial instruments (Shiller 
1993). 
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lending occurs at all in the absence of third-party enforcement. Cole and Kehoe (1995) 
argue that if no banker can enter into credible commitments, reputation alone can sustain 
a considerable amount of lending. Kletzer and Wright (2000) show how lending can 
occur under conditions of “anarchy” – that is, in the absence of commitment by both 
borrower and lender. In contrast, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) emphasize the importance of 
sanctions – penalties above and beyond the withholding of funds.7 Empirical work on the 
relevance of these theoretical approaches includes Eichengreen and Portes (1989), who 
find that trade sanctions were rare historically. In contrast, Mitchener and Weidenmier 
(2010) show that sanctions were important in Latin America during the 19th century. 
Debt restructurings can be long and time-consuming (Benjamin and Wright 
2009). Nonetheless, Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007) argue that repeated cycles of 
borrowing and default may be an efficient outcome, with lenders having an incentive to 
let borrowers escape from debt overhang. Bolton and Jeanne (2007) suggest that 
contracts that are ex post excessively difficult to restructure can be the result of efficient 
bargaining ex ante. Philip II’s defaults were resolved quickly and with moderate haircuts, 
suggesting that the payment suspensions were closer to an implicit contingent contract 
than to full-scale breakdowns in debt markets. 
This paper is part of a larger research project on the debts of Philip II. Elsewhere, 
we show that Castile’s fiscal position was sustainable (Drelichman and Voth 2010), and 
that lending worked because it was concentrated in the hands of a small, stable group of 
Genoese bankers (Drelichman and Voth 2011a). We also examine the profitability from 
the lending contracts over the long run and by lender (Drelichman and Voth 2011b). 
                                                
7 Strictly speaking, both the reputation and the sanctions view imply that defaults should not be observed in 
equilibrium. This implication can be avoided in models with imperfect information (Atkeson 1991), or 
when markets are incomplete (Kovrijnykh and Szentes 2007; Arellano 2008; Yue 2010). 
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Finally, we explore the fiscal logic of imperial ambition, comparing Britain and Spain at 
the height of their power (Drelichman and Voth 2008). Relative to these articles, we 
make the following contributions: We show that most short-term debt was contingent, 
that there was effective risk-sharing between Crown and bankers, and that the defaults 
did not violate the implicit contract between both parties.8 
II. Historical background 
During the 16th century, Imperial Spain was at the height of her powers. Philip II ruled 
territories from Flanders to the Philippines and from Tierra del Fuego to the Caribbean. 
After borrowing approximately 60% of GDP from Spanish and foreign lenders, Philip II 
stopped payments to his bankers four times. His bankruptcies have long been interpreted 
as signs of a hopeless fiscal situation (Thompson 1994), and lending to the Spanish 
Crown has often been described as irrational (Braudel 1966). An alternative interpretation 
stresses the need for sanctions to align a monarch’s incentives (Conklin 1998). According 
to this view, Genoese bankers retaliated after Philip II’s default, stopping transfers to the 
Low Countries. The Army of Flanders promptly mutinied, weakening Spain’s position 
substantially. Lending in 16th century Spain took place in what Kletzer and Wright (2000) 
call an anarchic environment, without either borrower or lenders having access to a 
commitment technology. Elsewhere, we show that no effective transfer stop materialized; 
a shortage of funds was not key for the setback in the Low Countries (Drelichman and 
Voth 2011a). Philip II’s borrowing was most likely sustained through reputational 
concerns alone. 
                                                
8 Cox (2011) argues that, in the absence of third-party commitment, it was not possible to separate 
insurance from debt contracts. The introduction of ministerial responsibility after the Glorious Revolution 
would have broken this link in England.   
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Foreign bankers began to lend to the Crown of Castile in 1519, when Jakob 
Fugger financed Charles V’s bid for the Holy Roman Crown. Charles continued to rely 
on the Fugger and Welser to finance military ventures. His credit was based on the fast-
growing Castilian economy (Alvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2007). In 1556, 
Charles abdicated.9 His son and successor, Philip II, had to contend with a challenging 
fiscal situation. One of his first decisions was to stop paying interest and principal on the 
Fugger and Welser loans in 1557 – the first of a total of 13 payment stops by Spain 
between 1550 and 1913. Lending briefly resumed, followed by another payment stop in 
1560. The Crown’s settlement with the Fuggers entailed turning over the administration 
of royal assets, including the masterships of the military orders and the mercury mines at 
Almadén.  
Despite the early defaults, Philip II borrowed on a vast scale. Whenever possible, 
he issued juros – perpetual or lifetime bonds backed by a specific tax stream. Yearly juro 
payments were typically collected from tax farmers or a city. As long as revenue was 
healthy, they provided a steady source of income for the owner. Juros were transferable 
after payment of a fee. They were often held by merchants and foreign investors, and 
were considered very safe investments.10 Philip II never defaulted on their payments 
during his reign. Yields were correspondingly low (5 to 7 percent between 1550 and 
1600).11 
                                                
9 The standard source on Charles V’s loans is Carande (2011). 
10 The account book of Ambrogio Di Negro, a Genoese merchant in the 1560s, shows investments in six 
different types of juros as part of his overall portfolio (Archivio Doria, Fondo Doria, 143). The letters of 
another merchant, Giorgio Doria, contain specific instructions to his agent in Spain on how to collect the 
yearly payments of his juros (Archivio Doria, Fondo Doria, 490).  
11 For a history of juros, see Toboso Sánchez (1987). 
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Juros were a cheap source of funding, but they had two major constraints. First, 
finding buyers for large issues could be challenging. The Crown did not have a 
distribution network of its own, and had to rely on intermediaries. Also, juros could only 
be issued against “ordinary” revenue. The designation of “ordinary” or “extraordinary” 
for a revenue stream was controlled by the Cortes – Castile’s representative assembly. 
Without tax increases – also controlled by the Cortes – or a reclassification of 
extraordinary taxes, the king was faced with a hard ceiling on long-term debt issuance. 
Lifting it required lengthy negotiations and costly concessions. 
Whenever juro issuance reached its ceiling, or when the king needed to borrow on 
short notice, he resorted to asientos, short-term loans repaid from extraordinary revenues. 
Of these, taxes on silver imports were the largest. Silver taxes reached up to 40% of total 
revenue in good years – but they could also be very low in bad times. Such variability 
created a strong need for intertemporal smoothing. Asientos were supplied by both 
domestic and international financiers; they often involved transfers abroad. The debt 
service and repayment of asientos was not as automatic as that in the case of juros: an 
explicit payment order (libranza) was needed to collect each repayment. Delays were 
common, as was the rolling over of unpaid debts into new loans. 
After 1560, Genoese bankers entered the business, and the volume of lending 
soon dwarfed earlier levels (Ulloa 1977; Drelichman and Voth 2011a). Genoese loans 
were typically collateralized with juros.12 Collateralizing short-term sovereign loans with 
long-term appears paradoxical, since monarchs could default on either. However,  juros 
                                                
12 At first, lending was collateralized with revenues of the Casa de la Contratación, which oversaw the 
assessment and taxation of silver. While the management of the Casa was dismal, and the bonds it issued 
quickly lost up to 50% of their value, collateralization continued with other juros. An excellent treatment of 
the system set up by the Genoese with respect to the Casa de la Contratación can be found in Ruiz Martín 
(1965). 
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were not only held by bankers, but by many members of the Castilian elite, making a 
default more costly for the king. Bankers often kept the collateral bonds in lieu of 
repayment, selling them to European investors and further profiting from the 
intermediation services.13 
Figure 1 shows short-term debt issuance (in constant 1566 ducats). After the 
Genoese entered the market, the king defaulted two more times. On September 1, 1575 
he suspended principal and interest payments on loans for 14.6 million ducats, and a 
lending moratorium ensued. A comprehensive settlement (medio general) was reached in 
October 1577. All outstanding asientos were canceled. The king repaid his bankers with 
juros, with an average value of 62% of outstanding debts.14 Bankers holding collateral 
juros recovered almost 80% of their capital, while uncollateralized loans were reduced by 
over 50% in value. As part of the settlement, a consortium of bankers offered 5 million 
ducats in fresh lending.15 
                                                
13 Selective defaults were technically possible. However, two reasons made them unlikely. First, the king 
would have no moral justification for defaulting; unlike in the case of asientos, investor payments for juros 
were made upfront, and the contractual conditions were unilaterally set by the Crown. Also, a selective 
default would have likely scared off other investors, and driven up the low interest rates that made juros a 
powerful financing tool in the first place. In this sense, the incentives that supported collateralization of one 
type of debt instrument with another are similar to those in Broner, Martín and Ventura (2010). 
14 Alvarez Nogal and Chamley (2012) argue that, because juros were callable and prevailing interest rates 
were falling, the defaults and the subsequent settlements can be interpreted as voluntary debt conversions. 
The results would have been the same if the king had called in all debt, and issued new, lower yielding 
juros in exchange. Our view is the opposite – the payment stops were abrupt, and the restructurings 
involved substantial haircuts. The haircut rate varied depending on the structure of each contract. 
Uncollateralized asiento holders, for example, received about 50% of their original value in the settlement, 
while the juro rate reduction was much less. These facts are hard to reconcile with a ‘voluntary’ 
conversion. 
15 The fact that the bankruptcies were resolved with generous settlements is compatible with interpretations 
emphasizing the importance of signalling a borrower’s type (Cole, Dow, and English 1995). We discuss the 
details of the settlement in depth in the appendix to Drelichman and Voth (2010). The negotiations during 
the suspension of payments and the mechanism used by the Genoese to enforce the lending moratorium are 
described in Drelichman and Voth (2011a). 
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Source: Drelichman and Voth (2010). 
Figure 1: Asiento issues 
After the 1575 default, little short-term debt was issued. Silver income grew quickly; a 
lull in the Dutch Revolt reduced military expenditure; and the Cortes of 1575 and 1576 
granted a large tax increase. Military events changed this situation starting in 1583. 
Short-term borrowing increased to finance the ‘Invincible Armada’, Spain’s ill-fated 
attempt to invade England in 1588. After its defeat, ships and fortifications needed to be 
rebuilt, while fighting in the Netherlands flared up. Despite the introduction of a new 
excise tax (the millones) in 1591, the king again defaulted on short-term loans in 1596. 
His last bankruptcy involved only 7 million ducats of principal – much less than in 1575. 
Its resolution was also faster and caused milder losses for creditors. After just one year, 
bankers agreed to a 20% across-the-board reduction of principal; lending resumed 
quickly. 
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At all times, the majority of royal debt consisted of juros. Between 1566 and 
1596, asientos averaged 12% of outstanding loans. Their share peaked in 1575, when 
short-term debt accounted for one third of the total. This was an anomalous situation, 
reflecting a large, rapid run-up of debt. In 1596, only ten percent of debt was short-term. 
Philip II never defaulted on juros. His famous bankruptcies affected only the smaller – 
but nonetheless significant – part of his obligations.16 
III. Data 
The complete series of 434 asientos issued under Philip II, and preserved in the Archive 
of Simancas, forms the basis of our study. Each contains a brief summary, reporting the 
names of the lenders, the date, and the total amount involved. Previous work on this 
series was based on these abstracts (Ulloa 1977), and did not analyze the terms and 
conditions of the loans in any detail. Our data are based on the full text of the contracts. 
In addition, we use a comprehensive database on Castile’s fiscal position for the period 
1566-1598 (Drelichman and Voth 2010).  
The full archival series contains 4,997 handwritten pages, with an average of 12 
pages per loan. We transcribe every single clause and reconstruct agreed-upon monthly 
cash flows. In addition, we code up to 89 variables for each asiento. These include the 
date, the identity of the lenders, the principal of the loan, its maturity, the places and 
currencies of disbursement and repayment, the intended source of funds to be used for 
repayment, the value and type of any collateral, the presence of any contingent clauses 
and the events that would trigger them, and the value of any additional privileges granted 
to the bankers.  
                                                
16 Data for total outstanding debt is from Drelichman and Voth (2010). 
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Calculating the rate of return is complicated several factors. Because of rules 
against usury, stated rates were lower than the overall return.17 Allowances for exchange 
fees, shipping costs, and various other concessions were used to increase profits.18 To 
assess the cost of each asiento, we reconstruct the contractual cash flows according to the 
loan covenant. We then calculate the modified internal rate of return (MIRR):  
€ 
MIRR = −FV positive cash flows, rr( )
PV negative cash flows, rf( )
n −1 (1) 
where n is the number of periods in the contract, rr is the reinvestment rate, and rf is the 
finance rate. This requires assumptions about rr and rf. We use 7.14% (the long-term bond 
rate) as the reinvestment rate, and 5% as the finance rate.19 
Table 1 summarizes our data. 20 out of the 434 contracts do not contain sufficient 
information to reconstruct a complete cash flow.20 For the remaining ones, we calculate 
the expected rate of return, both under the baseline scenario, and under any 
contingencies. For a handful of contracts, the estimated rate of return is very high. These 
are typically small, short-term loans involving high fixed costs. To mitigate the impact of 
these outliers, we drop loans with a rate of return over 100% (21 observations accounting 
for 1.8% of total lending). We thus work with 393 observations. Among these, the 
                                                
17 The legal limit against usury had stood at 10% since 1534, when Charles V issued a law to such effect. 
Philip II confirmed it in 1567. See Nueva Recopilación, Libro Quinto, Título XVIII, Ley ix. 
18 Among them were the granting of licenses to export bullion in excess of the amounts required by the 
contract, life pensions bestowed on the bankers or their relatives, and the conversion of low-yield juros into 
high-yield ones at no cost. 
19 One important reason for choosing the MIRR over the standard internal rate of return (IRR) is that the 
latter is unsuitable for cash flows that swing from positive to negative multiple times, a very common 
scenario in our data. In Drelichman and Voth (2011b) we explore in detail the benefits of our rate of return 
measure and our parameter choices. We also perform extensive sensitivity analysis. Our choice of 7.14% 
for the reinvestment rate is chosen after the median juro rate – juros were readily available, and hence 
obtaining a 7.14% return was easily achievable. The 5% finance rate was chosen after the rate Genoese 
bankers paid on their deposits. 
20 This is mostly due to material damage to the documents. In a few cases, the clauses were too vague to 
allow an accurate estimation of cash flows and rates of return. 
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average loan rate was 20 percent, and roughly half of all loans involved transfers abroad. 
The mean return rates did not vary when contingent clauses were triggered, while the 
median increased by one percent. Loans were typically extended for two years, but 
durations could be much longer. 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 mean median sd N min max 
Rate of return (MIRR) 0.20  0.136 0.17 393 -    0.18 0.95 
Foreign exchange dummy 0.41 0 0.49 393 0 1 
Transfer dummy 0.62 1 0.48 393 0 1 
Contingency dummy 0.69 1 0.46 393 0 1 
MIRR under contingency* 0.20  0.146 0.18 408 -    0.06 1.51 
Duration   28.75      22 22.63 393 0 140 
* 268 contracts had contingency clauses, and several had more than one. We report summary statistics on 
the MIRR for each of the 408 individual contingent scenarios. 
Types of contingencies 
Of the 393 contracts we analyze, 270 have at least one contingency clause; many contain 
several. In total, there are 408 contingent scenarios. Five broad categories can be 
distinguished. The first two are associated with events outside the control of the king or 
the bankers: the arrival of the fleet, and the performance of specific tax streams. Two 
more types are actually options, given to either the king or the bankers. In some cases, the 
king can delay payments, usually in exchange for some penalty. In others, the banker can 
request to be paid in juros ahead of the loan maturity date. We call these options “king’s 
discretion” and “banker’s discretion”. Finally, those contracts that carry collateral also 
have an “execution” clause. This specifies under what conditions the banker may seize 
and sell the collateral.  
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Source: see the text 
Figure 2: Distribution of the major contingent scenario, by number of contracts and 
by principal 
 
Figure 2 plots the frequency and the value of contingencies in our data. Less than a third 
of contracts were issued without a contingency clause. About 31% of scenarios refer to 
insufficient revenue for the Crown – either because some taxes fall short, or because the 
treasure fleets do not arrive on time or in sufficient size. Slightly over 40% of contingent 
clauses give either the banker or the king discretion to change the timing or the nature of 
payments. The remaining ones give the banker the right to seize and sell collateral if the 
king fails to repay.  
 The use of collateral clauses was not constant over time, as figure 3 shows. 
Contingent clauses were curtailed during the period 1576-1585, while they were widely 
used in the run up to the 1575 and 1596 bankruptcies.  
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Source: see the text 
Figure 3: Contingent and non-contingent borrowing over time. 
We now illustrate the working of contingency clauses using specific examples from the 
primary sources. In 1566, the king enters into a contract with Lucian Centurion and 
Agustin Spinola. They disburse 38,000 and 57,000 ducats in Flanders in May and 
September of that year, and are meant to receive one payment in August, using the 
proceeds from the first silver fleet.21 If the fleet does not arrive by the end of July, the 
king promises to pay a penalty rate of 1% per month until full repayment is made. The 
bankers also receive a juro that covers the full value of the contract, which they are 
allowed to sell in case the king fails to meet his obligations. The original contract without 
contingency clauses produced an annualized MIRR of 24.1%. If the contingency clauses 
are invoked, this falls to 15.6%. Thus, the king can insure part of the income risk that 
                                                
21 This asiento also shows how loans were combined with transfers. The bankers first disburse 38,000 
ducats; the king next repays principal and interest on 95,000 ducats; and only afterwards do the bankers 
disburse the final 57,000 ducats in Flanders. The latter disbursement is therefore a transfer rather than a 
loan, since the bankers had already received the money from the king. 
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comes from the highly volatile silver revenue stream. At the same time, the bankers’ 
financial position is largely safeguarded against the risk that the king could not or would 
not pay through the use of collateral juros.22  
Another asiento shows how variable tax revenue could also trigger contingency 
clauses. In October 1581, Juan Ortega de la Torre lends 60,000 ducats to the king. He is 
to be repaid from the second payment of the excusado.23 De la Torre is not to be first in 
line – the contract specifies that Baltasar Cattaneo shall collect his money first. 
Importantly, the banker will have to do the collecting himself, to which end the king 
provided him with the necessary documentation. Should the revenue from the excusado 
be insufficient, the banker has the right to be repaid from the perlados y cabildos (a 
minor revenue stream levied on ecclesiastical rents). Other contracts in this category 
specify that, if the tax revenue in one year is insufficient, the king will pay a penalty 
interest rate until he can repay with the following year’s taxes.24  
We now turn to a more complex asiento. It showcases how multiple contingent 
clauses could be used to provide insurance for both king and bankers under a variety of 
scenarios. In 1591, Tomas Fiesco, a Genoese banker, agreed to provide 300,000 Flemish 
ecus.25 200,000 ecus were paid out to the military commander in Flanders, the Duke of 
Parma, while the rest were delivered at the Italian payment fairs of Besançon. The king 
paid 75,000 ducats at the signing of the contract, and hence the actual loan was for 
218,000 ducats (the rest was a mere transfer of funds). The first disbursement by the 
                                                
22 The deeper reason for collateralizing with juros is that fiscal centralization in Castile was limited – the 
king could sometimes not pay the bankers directly, but the City of Seville, say, would still pay holders of 
juros. Thus, the fragmentation of fiscal authority facilitated the continuation of lending.  
23 A tax levied on Church revenue, one of the so-called Three Graces, introduced in 1567. 
24 This example also shows the importance of weak tax collecting powers in determining lending 
arrangements, with the king effectively outsourcing the right to access taxes already collected. 
25 Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Contadurias Generales, Legajo 90.  
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banker, also in April, was for 61,500 ecus. It was followed by 9 equal monthly payments 
of 26,500 ecus each. 
The king promised to repay from a variety of sources. Several of these payments 
are not contingent: 84,700 ducats from the new millones excises in November 1591 and 
May 1592; another 60,000 from the Cruzada ecclesiastical tax, in October and November 
1592; 12,000 ducats from the sales of vacant lands; and 30,000 ducats from the 
extraordinary service. The single largest payment, for 90,100 ducats, was to come from 
the proceeds of the silver fleet of 1591, which was expected in late summer or early fall. 
This was followed by a fleet contingency clause: if the silver did not arrive by October, a 
penalty of 1% per month would apply until the banker was repaid from alternative tax 
streams –specifically the subsidio, excusado, and the ordinary and extraordinary services. 
Payments from these sources were disbursed by the treasury every four months, in 
March, July and November. 
Even if the fleet arrived on time, the king could unilaterally choose to delay 
repayment until the maturity of the loan, twelve months later – a case of “king’s 
discretion”. It came at a steep cost: if the contingency was invoked, the banker had the 
right to stop the remaining disbursements (for a total of 53,000 ecus) while still being 
entitled to collect all the promised repayments on earlier disbursements. 
Finally, from January 1592, the banker had the right to request repayment of up to 
100,000 ducats of principal and interest in perpetual juros – a banker’s discretion clause. 
This contingency allowed the banker to receive safe bonds instead of promised cash 
payments. 
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Table 2 shows the cash flows for the Fiesco contract under the baseline scenario, 
and under each of the fleet and king’s discretion contingencies. Because the banker’s 
discretion contingency only affects the payment instruments but not the actual timing or 
values, we do not report it in a separate column. 
Table 2: Net cash flows from the Fiesco contract under three repayment scenarios 
 
Baseline scenario Fleet contingency King’s discretion 
Apr-91 14,931 14,931 14,931 
May-91 -25,884 -25,884 -25,884 
Jun-91 -25,884 -25,884 -25,884 
Jul-91 -25,884 -25,884 -25,884 
Aug-91 -25,884 -25,884 -25,884 
Sep-91 -25,884 -25,884 -25,884 
Oct-91 -25,884 -25,884 -25,884 
Nov-91 124,283 34,183 34,183 
Dec-91 -25,884 -25,884 0 
Jan-92 -13,948 -13,948 0 
Feb-92 0 0 0 
Mar-92 0 31,535 0 
Apr-92 0 0 0 
May-92 54,767 54,767 54,767 
Jun-92 0 0 0 
Jul-92 0 32,736 0 
Aug-92 0 0 0 
Sep-92 0 0 0 
Oct-92 30,033 30,033 30,033 
Nov-92 30,033 63,971 120,133 
    
Yearly MIRR 23.2% 24.0% 39.8% 
Note: figures are in ducats. 1 ducat = 1.023 ecus.  
 
The baseline scenario yields a 23.2% return for the banker. While higher than average, 
this was not an unusual cost for a contract that included transfers to multiple locations, 
deliveries in several currencies, and repayments sourced from many different tax streams. 
Under the fleet contingency scenario, the king misses the largest part of the November 
payment (some 90,100 ducats) in 1591, and makes up the shortfall in March, July, and 
November of 1592 with 1% monthly interest. The rate of return of the contract increases 
slightly, to 24%. 
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 The king’s discretion scenario is markedly different. The king also misses the 
90,100 ducat payment in November of 1591, causing the banker to cancel the December 
and January disbursements. The king is still obliged to make all promised repayments, 
including the 90,100 ducat one, which is now due in November 1592. The banker gets 
paid much later than promised, but since he skips two disbursements totaling over 50,000 
ducats, his rate of return increases to 39.8% 
 It is useful to contrast the two contingencies: the cash flows are identical up to 
and including November 1591. The missed payment is exactly the same. In one case, 
however, the reason is an exogenous, verifiable event: the fleet has not arrived. The 
banker continues to make disbursements as scheduled, while repayments are delayed. 
The cost of the contract rises marginally. In the second case, however, the fleet has 
arrived. If the king now fails to pay, he has less of an excuse; the cost of the contract rises 
substantially.  
The fleet contingency insures the king against factors outside his control – 
adverse Caribbean weather and disruptions to silver production. Because these factors are 
self-equilibrating in the medium term, the bankers do not charge high insurance premia. 
The king’s discretion contingency is different. It gives the king the option to extend the 
maturity of his debts without having to borrow new funds, even if the fleet arrived in 
time. The king is now protected against an unexpected need for liquidity, or the prospect 
of a rollover crisis. Because these situations would signal mounting pressure on the 
king’s finances (or a lower willingness to use available funds for repayments), the banker 
demands a hefty premium in exchange for providing that insurance. Finally, the banker’s 
discretion clause insures the lender against a downturn in the king’s ability to pay. After 
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the first eight months of the contract, the banker can swap almost all of his remaining 
claims for relatively safe long-term bonds of the same present value. 
IV. The Economic Impact of Contingency Clauses 
In this section, we examine the effect of contingent clauses on cash flows. We also 
analyze cost and maturity modifications as a function of the Crown’s and bankers’ 
interests. Contingent clauses provided ample, bi-directional risk sharing between the king 
and his bankers. Their use is interesting because they reveal a strong preference to deal 
with eventualities ex ante, before they materialize, instead of having to renegotiate ex 
post. This implies that frequent recontracting (in the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff 1989) 
was not costless in the eyes of Crown and financiers. 
 
Source: see the text 
Figure 4: Changes in the Cost of Contracts and in Maturity (after conditionality 
clause is invoked) 
 
For each contingent scenario, we compare its MIRR to that of the non-contingent cash 
flow scenario. Loans that feature contingent scenarios have a baseline return of 20.5%. In 
aggregate, contingencies do not affect the returns substantially. The median change in the 
cost of a contract is exactly zero under the average contingent scenario.26 The left panel 
                                                
26 By comparison, the median return of loans that do not have contingent clauses is 19 percent. 
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in Figure 4 plots the distribution of cost changes. While some contracts saw their cost rise 
or fall by 20% p.a. or more, most changes are much smaller – the bulk of observations 
envisage changes of 5% p.a. or so.  
 Contingent scenarios also affected the maturity of the loans. On average, 
maturities changed little – an increase of two months with a standard deviation of nine. 
One hundred and twenty one scenarios allow for a longer maturity, giving the king an 
average of 9.7 additional months to repay. In 18 cases, there is an early termination date, 
either because the king could exercise an early repayment clause, or because a missed 
payment allowed bankers to cancel future disbursements. In these cases, the average 
termination date precedes the originally scheduled one by 17.6 months. The remaining 
269 scenarios do not affect the maturity date, either because they shuffle intermediate 
repayments, or because they specify a swap of payment instruments.  
Table 3: Baseline MIRR, differential MIRR and maturity (in months) by type of 
contingency.  
Contingency type Frequency MIRR Differentials 
Maturity 
Differential 
  baseline minus non contingent average* 
 contingency minus 
baseline 
 contingency minus 
baseline 
Fleet 26 
 
4.1% 
(0.72) 
 0.4% 
(0.75) 
2.6 
(0.00) 
Tax stream 
insufficiency 
100 
 
-1.6% 
(0.10) 
-1.7% 
(0.06) 
4.6 
(0.00) 
King’s discretion 63 
 
4.3% 
(0.03) 
4.1% 
(0.06) 
1.6 
(0.30) 
Banker’s discretion 102 
 
1.6% 
(0.08) 
1.5% 
(0.04) 
-0.2 
(0.84) 
Collateral execution 118 
 
-2.1% 
(0.03) 
-2.3% 
(0.01) 
2.1 
(0.00) 
Total / Average 408 0.0% -0.1% 2.1 
P-values in parentheses. 
* Coefficient from a regression of MIRR on contingency type dummy, use of foreign exchange clause, 
duration, and loan size. Standard errors are clustered at the contract level. 
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Table 3 summarizes contingent changes in the MIRR and the maturity of loans. The first 
column shows the differential in the rate of return for each contingency type, relative to 
contracts without contingencies. The second and third columns report the associated 
changes in the MIRR and maturity. Modifications reflect changes in the king’s fiscal 
position associated with each contingency type. In case of a fleet-related event, the 
maturity of the loan was extended for an average of 2.6 months. The cost increased only 
by a small amount.27 On average the bankers received some compensation, reflecting 
only a minor increase in risk. Fleets would eventually arrive, and delays did not convey 
new information about the solvency of the king. At the same time, bankers on average 
required some additional compensation entering into contracts that had a fleet 
contingency written into them – on average, the baseline cost was 4.1 percent higher 
(even if variability was high, and the difference is not statistically significant).  
Tax revenue shortfalls were a different matter. Most taxes were collected directly 
by cities or tax farmers, which had an incentive to maximize revenue. Their performance 
was independently verifiable by the lenders. The incentives of bankers and those of tax 
collectors were compatible, and there was no possibility for the king to manipulate the 
total yields.28  Tax stream insufficiencies were bad news, since shortfalls were not likely 
to be offset in the future. However, they did not convey information about the king’s 
type. The associated contingent scenarios gave the king an extra 4.6 months to repay, 
while reducing rates of return by 1.7 percentage points. Consistent with a risk-sharing 
arrangement, a negative shock in terms of fiscal revenue resulted in a reduction of 
                                                
27 The increase is a mere 0.4%; the difference in cost compared to the baseline is not statistically 
significant. 
28 The king could, however, manipulate the order in which lenders were paid. Contracts were therefore 
quite specific in establishing the collection priority of individual lenders with respect to specific tax 
revenues. 
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borrowing costs. The baseline cost of loan agreements with a tax shortfall clause was 1.6 
percentage points below the average; bankers were willing to offer this type of 
“insurance” without a premium.  
 “King’s discretion” scenarios involve non-payment without an externally 
verifiable trigger. The arbitrary postponement of payments by the king was undoubtedly 
bad news, either because of new, urgent spending needs or because other loans were 
receiving priority for repayment. Unlike the case of tax stream insufficiencies, the cause 
of the need for extra liquidity was uncertain, and moral hazard could not be ruled out. 
The risk to the bankers was increasing compared to the original contract. Risk-sharing 
implies that this additional risk should be associated with higher promised returns for the 
bankers. The large differential – 4.1% on average – is consistent with this interpretation. 
Contracts with a postponement option for the king were also more expensive in the 
baseline scenario, by an average of 4.3%.  
The effect of “banker’s discretion” is more difficult to evaluate, as there are 
liquidity considerations to take into account. These clauses typically allowed bankers to 
collect part or all repayments in juros instead of cash. There was often no reduction in the 
amount payable, and bankers were allowed to collect the entire current-term interest of 
the juros.29 This accounts for the increase of 1.5% in the rate of return. In practice this 
accounting profit probably did not translate into an actual cash-flow advantage. Bankers 
would have had to sell juros on the secondary market, a costly operation that could easily 
nullify the 1.5% gain. If they chose to keep the bonds, they would have had to wait for 
coupon payments. A reasonable guess is that “banker’s discretion” clauses allowed 
                                                
29 Juro interest was paid twice yearly. If the banker received juros in October, he would be allowed to 
collect the entire December interest payment, rather than the portion corresponding to the three months he 
had held the bond. This increases the profitability of the contract relative to a cash payout in December. 
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lenders to switch their repayments to safer assets without a substantial impact on 
profitability. Bankers typically entered into these contracts when they had reason to be 
concerned about the future yield of extraordinary revenues. Whenever asientos contained 
these clauses, they were on average 1.6% more expensive initially for the king. 
 The final contingency type was collateral executions. These were triggered by the 
king missing the final payment of the loan. Because the event was pre-defined in the 
contractual clauses, it was not considered a default. When it was exercised, the cost of the 
contract fell. Sometimes the contracts specified that the bankers had to wait before being 
able to sell collateral juros  – hence the two month average maturity increase, which 
reduced profitability. Bankers also lost because collateral was not always sufficient to 
cover the last repayment. When bankers and the king’s representatives entered into 
contracts with a collateral execution clause, the cost was on average 2.1 percentage points 
lower. This reflects the additional security of holding a collateralized loan.  
  Our findings suggest that the king was mainly concerned with the risk of a 
liquidity shortfall; the cost of borrowing mattered less. The majority of short-term loan 
contracts allowed the postponing of payment or the swapping of payment instruments. 
Return differences by type of contingency strongly suggest that these options allowed for 
effective risk sharing arrangements. Instead of having to find fresh funds to redeem 
maturing debt, the king had the right to extend the maturity of his borrowing, either by 
delaying payments or by swapping short term debt for perpetual bonds. At the same time, 
the bankers reduced the risks from the king changing his spending priorities. The most 
costly eventualities – looking at the combined effect of the higher baseline cost and the 
cost of the contingency cost – were those triggered at the king’s discretion. Here, bankers 
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received an extra 8.4% in interest. In other words, when the Crown postponed payments 
without “just cause” in the form of late fleet arrivals or tax insufficiencies, the increase in 
borrowing costs was particularly large. Bankers realized that writing an option on such 
eventualities did not contain good news about the king’s financial position and priorities, 
and demanded to be compensated accordingly.  
We now take a closer look at the effect of contingent clauses on loan maturities. 
In table 4, we regress the change in the due date of the loan (in months) on its original 
maturity, plus a host of controls.  
Table 4: Loan duration and contingencies 
(dependent variable is maturity increase) 
Constant -1.97 
(-2.31)** 
Fleet 
 
2.14 
(2.19)** 
Tax stream insufficiency 4.07 
(6.19)*** 
King’s discretion 0.44 
(0.28) 
Banker’s discretion -1.03 
(-0.97) 
Collateral execution 1.19 
(2.02)** 
Principal (real) -1.13 
(-0.96) 
Duration 0.07 
(1.72)* 
FX 1.58 
(1.88)* 
R2 0.09 
N  531 
Standard errors clustered at the contract level; t-statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Longer duration loans do not substantially affect maturity extensions in case a 
contingency clause is invoked – the coefficient is significant, but small. When 
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contingency clauses are invoked, contracts with a foreign exchange component (FX) are 
associated with extensions of over a month and a half. Fleet contingencies extend the due 
date by two months on average – a typical time for finding an alternative repayment 
source. Tax stream shortfalls are associated with even longer extensions – four months on 
average. Collateral executions add only one month. King and banker discretion clauses 
mainly reshuffled payments before the maturity of the loan, and hence are not 
significantly associated with changes in the due date. 
In figure 5, we examine the evolution of contingency clauses by five-year 
intervals. In the years before the 1575 bankruptcy, over 50% of clauses are associated 
with collateral executions. At the same time, almost 25% refer to shocks that reduce the 
Crown’s revenue, such as fleet arrival and revenue shortfalls. Collateral execution clauses 
vanish as a category after the 1575 default. There is little borrowing – and hence few 
contingencies – up to 1585, when the preparations for the Armada trigger a new round of 
asientos. In the last fifteen years of the sample, banker discretion clauses become the top 
category, followed by revenue shortfalls. 
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 Source: see the text 
Figure 5: Number of contingent scenarios by type and by period 
The use of contingent loans was not affected by the 1575 default – their share is roughly 
constant before and after.30 Their composition, however, was significantly altered. Before 
1575, most contingent contracts had collateral clauses. During the 1575 bankruptcy, the 
Crown declared that asientos had been illegal, and payments on the collateral bonds were 
suspended. Bankers were prevented from selling them in the secondary market. The 1577 
settlement reversed these restrictions. Nonetheless, few bankers were interested in 
collateral execution clauses afterwards. They instead used “banker’s discretion”, which 
allowed for juros to be sold at will. Banker’s discretion clauses were also priced to offset 
the cost of collecting and transferring the juros. In essence, bankers learnt how to better 
protect themselves – if before they had to wait for the king to miss a payment to switch to 
safe assets, now they could do it at the slightest hint of trouble. 
                                                
30 The exception was the 1576-1580 period, when most lending came from the 1577 settlement. 
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Why was it in the interest of bankers and the king to write these contracts? Three 
facts are key: first, the absence of asymmetric information as a result of primitive means 
of communication, and the extraordinary opportunities for intertemporal barter at a time 
of urgent, sudden spending needs. Second, the pricing of loans and the effect of duration 
on interest cost suggests that the Crown principally struggled with liquidity issues, not 
solvency problems.31 Third, the fragmented nature of fiscal authority ensured that the 
Crown’s borrowing could be effectively collateralized by other debts. 
Both silver revenue and tax farming facilitated the use of contingencies. Silver 
was a major source of revenue for servicing asientos. News from the New World about 
silver production travelled at the same speed as galleons full of bullion, the king had no 
informational advantage vis-à-vis his bankers. There was also no way to hide the arrival 
of a fleet from the Indies. Also, the time of fleet arrival varied considerably (figure 6).  
                                                
31 In Drelichman and Voth (2010) we also show that the king’s fiscal position was sustainable in the long 
run. 
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Source: Morineau (1985) 
 
Figure 6: Frequency of fleet arrivals  
The key reasons why conditional contracts could be written on fleet revenues –  
new information about the king’s fiscal position was independently verifiable, and neither 
party had advance knowledge – also favored tax farming. Tax farmers had strong 
incentives to maximize revenue, and were not in the employ of the king. Revenue 
shortfalls reflected adverse shocks, not royal manipulation. 
V. Contingent Debt and Excusable Defaults 
We now turn to the nature of defaults. King and bankers contracted over a large number 
of different states of the world, and found an effective way to share risks. Nonetheless, 
some eventualities could not be written into loan covenants.32 Default under these 
conditions was also a form of risk-sharing, and it did not differ fundamentally from the 
contingencies foreseen in loan documents; it simply extended the sharing arrangements 
                                                
32 Shocks arising from military defeat are an obvious case in point – it would be hard for the Crown to 
contract on the possibility of the Armada sinking, say. 
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already in place to a different situation. We argue that the famous defaults of Philip II 
were excusable (in the sense of Grossman and van Huyck 1988).33 While violations of 
the letter of lending contracts occurred, these were anticipated by both sides, and were 
not contrary to lenders’ original expectations. To support this argument, we need to 
demonstrate that defaults occurred in times of exogenous, independently verifiable 
adverse shocks, and that there were no significant negative changes in loan conditions 
after an actual default.34 
Modern-day sovereign bonds issued in New York or London are said to be in 
default when the borrower has missed a single contractual payment. No such definition 
was agreed ex ante in sixteenth century dealings between Crown and bankers. At the 
time, neither side could firmly commit to servicing debts or to taking deposits. Actual 
outcomes could fall somewhere between full compliance and default: 1) full compliance 
with the baseline scenario, as detailed in the original contract, 2) use of contingency 
clauses, 3) violation of one or more of the clauses, followed by a rescheduling, 4) full 
suspension of payments to all creditors, followed by a general settlement, 5) outright 
repudiation.  
Because contracts already encompassed a wide range of states of the world, 
lenders were aware that repayment according to the letter of the loan contract was not 
always possible. At the same time, since contingencies were incorporated into loan 
documents, the Crown tried hard not to violate explicit loan conditions. If defaults are 
excusable, lenders’ outcomes should reflect a borrower’s fiscal position. Importantly, 
                                                
33 In Drelichman and Voth (2011b), we surmise that defaults were excusable; here, we argue the case based 
on a close reading of loan conditions and fiscal conditions. 
34 If there had been changes in actual loan conditions, these could also be rationalized by Bayesian updating 
(about, say, the strength of the Spanish navy). In this sense, demonstrating that rates did not change is 
requires the ‘strong’ version of our hypothesis to hold. 
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differences should be driven by exogenous shocks – events beyond the control of the 
borrower. In normal times, the king should live up to the letter of his obligations. When 
some minor shocks occur, he will invoke emergency clauses. Larger shocks will see him 
violate some of these clauses, only to compensate lenders later. Full-blown moratoria 
reflect larger negative shocks, and are driven by events that cannot be contracted over ex 
ante. Finally, for defaults to be excusable, repudiation should never be observed. This is 
the easiest part of the argument – Philip II never repudiated a loan.  
Default in Verifiably Bad States of the World 
For the Grossman and Van Huyck interpretation to be correct, defaults have to occur in 
bad states of the world. This was true under Philip II. Twin shocks hit his finances in 
1575 and 1596 – military expenditures surged, and revenue from the New World was 
low.  
 
Source: Drelichman and Voth (2010) 
Figure 7: Military expenditure, actual and HP-filtered, 1566-1596 
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From year to year, expenditure on armies and fleets varied considerably. The three spikes 
– 1572-75, 1587-88, and 1596 – reflect the escalation of the Dutch revolt, the Armada, 
and war with Britain. In two of these cases, the king defaulted.  
At first pass, the exogeneity of these shocks can be debated. It takes two powers 
to fight – it was not only the Dutch who rebelled and the English who supported them 
that contributed to bloodshed and high costs. Spain also had to decide to fight in order to 
keep control over its provinces intact, and the Mediterranean free from Ottoman 
influence. To what extent do we want to think of the Spanish strategy as a choice 
variable, and to what extent does it reflect a largely exogenous shock? 
The Dutch revolt had been simmering for a few years, and responding to it was a 
deliberate policy choice. Its escalation into a full blown – and costly – war of 
independence, however, was beyond the imagination of Spain’s ruler (and arguably, 
among European observers). The Armada was an intentional strategic move, planned and 
budgeted for over a period of years. Its failure was always a possibility and, in line with 
the requirements of the excusable defaults literature, it did not lead to a payment stop. 
The 1596 escalation of the Anglo-Spanish war was initiated by Britain; it required a 
major military effort on the part of Spain. These expenditure shocks were large. In 1574, 
military spending accounted for 93 percent of all expenditure (without debt servicing 
costs); it exceeded Crown revenue by 25 percent. In 1588, it also exceeded revenue, by 
16 percent (while staying below total revenue in 1596).35 
Philip II could have walked away from his possessions in the Low Countries. 
Doing so would probably have made the Spanish position unsustainable in many 
territories outside Castile – according to what Geoffrey Parker (1998) called the “domino 
                                                
35 All figures are from Drelichman and Voth (2010). 
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theory” of Spanish hegemony. Neither the war against the Ottoman Empire, nor the 
fighting in the Low Countries (of which the Armada was an integral part) were offensive 
wars as such; all of them were designed to protect revenue-generating territories. The fact 
that fighting back required decisions and effort does not detract from the basic 
observation that negative initial shocks to Philip II’s military position drove the need for 
armaments, fighting, and funding.  
 
Source: Drelichman and Voth (2010) 
Figure 8: Crown revenue, actual and HP-filtered, 1566-1596 
Figure 8 shows revenues compared to an HP-filtered trend during the final 30 years of 
Philip II’s reign. Revenue did not fluctuate as much as military expenditure. The king 
only defaulted in those years when revenue was markedly below trend and expenditures 
were simultaneously above trend. This confluence of expenditure and revenue shocks 
occurred in the mid-1570s, for several years in a row. As Figure 8 shows, there were also 
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many years when revenue was significantly below trend, and the king did not default. 
This does not contradict our hypothesis that the king’s defaults were excusable because 
they occurred in bad states of the world. The king does not have to default in all bad 
states; what matters is that he never defaults in good times. The observation is also easy 
to rationalize – silver revenues contributed importantly to volatility in the 1580s. Years of 
low revenue typically alternated with years of high revenue. Normal fluctuations were 
smoothed by extra asiento borrowing. Combined with risk-sharing elements in the loan 
contracts (such as the one with Tomas Fiesco), the Crown coped with most fluctuations. 
In years of extraordinary pressure, a payment stop was declared and a general 
renegotiation became necessary. 
The events that caused fiscal difficulties were easy enough to confirm and 
identify. Only one or two silver fleets reached Spain every year. The cargo of the arriving 
ships was a key determinant of Crown revenue. Once the ships had arrived, it proved 
impossible to suppress information on the size and value of the fleet.36 Commercial 
gazettes all over Europe carried details on the value of treasure brought from the Indies; a 
major determinant of the king’s fiscal position became public knowledge almost 
instantly. Military events such as the escalation of fighting in the Netherlands after 1568 
were also simple to verify. While not all years of high military expenditure or of revenue 
shortfalls led to payment stops, every default during Philip II’s reign occurred when the 
king’s fiscal position was poor. Importantly, strained finances reflected exogenous 
events, and not poor fiscal policy – they were caused by the Dutch rebellion flaring up 
and by Caribbean storms.  
 
                                                
36 See Morineau (1985). 
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No adverse change in loan conditions 
Defaults occurred in ‘bad times’; bankers to Philip II shouldered  some of the king’s 
fiscal risks, effectively providing insurance. The key question is if the defaults were de 
facto anticipated. If so, they were simply another instance of claims falling due on an 
insurance policy – with the Crown’s finances stretched, contracts could not be honored to 
the letter.  
If lenders did not understand that they were de facto holding contingent debt, and 
if the defaults were not excusable, then loan conditions after 1575 should have changed 
for the worse.37 Figure 9 presents the distribution of interest rate (MIRR) on asientos 
before and after the 1575 default. As is readily apparent, there is no systematic shift in the 
cost of loans. The range, means, and medians of both distributions are virtually identical. 
A t-test finds no evidence that the king’s access to credit became more expensive.38 
 
Source: see the text 
                                                
37 In Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005), rising interest rates after a default act as a punishment for borrowers that 
violated the original loan contract in a context of contingent lending. 
38 We obtain a value of 0.68 [p-value 0.49] 
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Figure 9: Rate of return on short-term loans, before and after 1575 
 
 
Source: see the text 
Figure 10: Size of loans, before and after 1575 
 
Alternatively, the quantity lent could have gone down. This is not what we find – the 
principal of loans did not decline. In figure 10, we plot the log size of loans before and 
after 1575. The average dropped from a log value of 11.86 to 11.83 (p-value 0.78). While 
the distributions are not identical, there is no systematic difference in the size of loans.39  
 Next, we examine the cost of borrowing in detail. In table 5, column 1, we regress 
rates of return on principal lent, foreign exchange clauses, and duration, as well as a post-
1575 dummy. We find that longer-duration lending, on average, was less expensive, a 
result that is consistent with the fixed cost of underwriting asientos and the relatively 
cheaper alternatives available to the king for long-term borrowing. The size of a loan was 
not a significant determinant of its cost. Foreign exchange transactions raised the cost of 
                                                
39 A t-test has a value of 0.48 [p-value 0.63] 
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borrowing by over 6% on average. Lending became 5% cheaper on average after the 
1575 default. If we estimate with banker fixed effects (column 2), the dummy variable for 
post-1575 loses its significance – the same bankers lent at the same rates at before, but 
bankers offering “dear” credit now played a smaller role. The post-1575 dummy becomes 
significant if we use robust regression estimation instead, and the size and significance of 
the coefficient is similar to simple OLS (column 3). The results do not suggest that the 
1575 default caused bankers to suddenly update their beliefs about the riskiness of 
lending to Philip II: They did not begin charging him more to compensate for higher 
perceived risk. If anything, the cost of borrowing dropped substantially after the 
resolution of the bankruptcy. 
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Table 5: Correlates of borrowing costs (dependent variable: MIRR) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS Robust regression OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 All years All years All years < 1576 >1575 All years All years 
        
Duration -0.0025*** -0.0027*** -0.0006*** -0.0023*** -0.0035** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** 
 (-6.65) (-6.03) (-3.27) (-3.93) (-4.39) (-6.35) (-4.10) 
        
FX clause 0.066*** 0.048** 0.024*** 0.029 0.071** 0.059** 0.040 
 (3.82) (2.35) (2.63) (0.99) (2.34) (2.40) (1.05) 
        
Principal  0.035 0.065 0.026 -0.145 0.150** 0.372 0.048 
 (1.05) (1.58) (1.44) (-1.56) (2.69) (1.30) (1.20) 
        
after 1575 -0.050*** -0.089 -0.066***   -0.051*** -0.067* 
dummy (-3.01) (-1.62) (-2.69)   (-3.08) (-1.82) 
        
Debt/revenue      0.010** 0.008 
ratio      (2.21) (1.09) 
        
Fiscal      0.001 -0.001 
balance      (0.26) (-0.21) 
        
Constant 0.264*** 0.461*** 0.212*** 0.403*** 0.359*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 
 (14.45) (4.30) (4.42) (4.65) (3.98) (5.18) (4.06) 
        
Banker fixed 
effects 
no yes yes yes yes no yes 
        
N 393 393 383 181 212 381 381 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.012 0.000 0.001 
adj. R2 0.137 0.130  0.133 0.146 0.149 0.155 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the year level in columns (6) and (7). 
 
In specifications (4) and (5), we estimate the basic regression for the period before and 
after 1575. Lending for a longer period was associated with significantly lower cost of 
financing. Before 1575, extending the duration of loans by one year (roughly one 
standard deviation) was associated with a 2.4% fall in the cost of borrowing; thereafter, 
the decline is 4%. If we test for the significance of the difference in the two coefficients 
by estimating jointly, and interacting the duration variable with the post-1575 dummy, we 
find a strong, significant, negative result (beta coefficient -0.015, t-statistic -3.05). 
Column 5 also shows a significant coefficient for principal, the size of a loan. This is in 
contrast to the result prior to 1575. At the same time, if we interact the post-1575 dummy 
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with the size of principal offered, we do not find a statistically significant shift in terms of 
loan pricing in response to lending volume. Overall, the only major changes in loan 
pricing after 1575 favored the Crown. 
In columns (6) and (7), we add two fiscal indicators as explanatory variables –the 
debt-to-revenue ratio and the fiscal balance.40 In column (6), the debt-to-revenue ratio is 
significant at the 5% confidence level, indicating that a unit rise of the ratio resulted in an 
additional 1% in borrowing costs for the king. Once banker fixed-effects are added, 
however, the coefficient is no longer significant. This implies that, as debts mounted, 
only a subset of  “premium” bankers continued to operate in the short-term debt market. 
The fiscal balance, in contrast, is never significant; bankers evidently did not take 
fluctuations in the budget into account when pricing loans.41 
In sum, 16th century Spanish defaults occurred in “bad times”. They did not make 
loans more expensive, and the Crown’s borrowing did not decline afterwards. This makes 
it likely that defaults were excusable in the sense of Grossman and Van Huyck (1988).  
VI. Conclusions 
Over the last 800 years, periods of debt accumulation have often been followed by 
default (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Despite these disruptions, the market for sovereign 
debt has not simply disappeared. What accounts for this resilience? We use a unique case 
study of serial defaults by a single sovereign to demonstrate that excusable defaults are an 
important factor. Analyzing over 400 loan covenants, hand-collected from the archives, 
we show that a significant share of short-term loans contained contingency clauses. Loan 
                                                
40 Data from Drelichman and Voth (2010). 
41 It should be noted that neither the debt stock nor the revenue ratio were readily available statistics. Oft he 
two, estimating the fiscal balance is substantially more difficult. This is true today, as it must have been for 
contemporaries (Drelichman and Voth 2010). 
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modifications allowed effective risk-sharing between king and bankers – an institutional 
solution that offered many of the desirable properties that contingent debt would have 
today (Borensztein and Mauro 2004).  
Contingent clauses and defaults were simply different points in the same spectrum 
of outcomes tied to uncertain realizations of the state of the world. While the loans were 
contracted over many possible scenarios, some could not be included or foreseen. When 
large, negative, and not previously foreseen events materialized, the king suspended 
payments: contracting over the Armada’s defeat, for example, was not feasible. A similar 
argument has been made for England before the Glorious Revolution. Gary Cox (2011) 
concludes that defaults there constituted the equivalent of insurance claims coming due. 
Lenders effectively insured the fortunes of English monarchs in their wars – if the 
outcome was good, they were repaid; if not, kings defaulted. Our analysis of Philip II’s 
borrowing expands this view, adding a wider range of contracting instruments, and 
several types of potential outcomes.  
Philip II’s payment stops also did not surprise his lenders. Bankers did not adjust 
their terms and conditions in a major way after the most severe default of Philip II’s 
reign, in 1575. Lending continued along similar lines as before, and resulted in relatively 
generous rates of return for creditors. Combined with the fact that a strikingly high 
proportion of loans contained contingency clauses, we argue that sovereign debt at the 
dawn of government borrowing was de facto contingent. Defaults also occurred in 
verifiably bad states of the world. In sum, these results strongly support the view that 
sovereign defaults can be excusable (Grossman and Van Huyck 1988). 
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